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Abstract
Economic historians have stressed that income convergence was a key feature
of the OECD-cluband that globalization was among the accelerating forces of
this process in the long-run. This view has however been challenged, since it
su¤ers from an ad hoc selection of countries. In the paper, a mixture model is
applied to a sample of 64 countries to endogenously analyze the cross-country
growth behavior over the period 1870-2003. Results show that growth patterns
were segmented in two worldwide regimes, the rst one being characterized by
convergence, and the other one denoted by divergence. Interestingly, when three
historical epochs are analyzed separately (1870-1913; 1913-1950; and 1950-2003),
the dynamics which come to dominate over the whole period emerged only during
the post-1950 years. In contrast, the First Global Wave was marked by global
divergence. Therefore, history does not provide unambiguous evidence about
globalization and convergence.
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1 Introduction
Starting with the pioneering studies by Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986), there
has been a general consensus that convergence in output per worker, or per capita, took
place among the industrialized economies since 1870 (see, among others, Maddison 1987;
Feinstein 1988; Broadberry 1993; Tortella 1994; and Toniolo 1998). Economic historians
have stressed that this process was fuelled by the two globalization stages of the periods
1870-1913 and post-1950, while the inter-war years (1913-1950) were characterized by
increased protectionism, slow growth and divergence. It has therefore been argued
that history provides an unambiguously positive relationship between globalization and
convergence (Williamson 1996, p. 277).
However, the previous evidence relies on the choice of a small and ad hoc set of
developed countries, that now belong to the so-called OECD-cluband that actually
converged ex post. In fact, those nations which have not converged since 1870 have
been excluded from the sample, due to their present relative poverty. This calls also
for a sample selection problem in long-term convergence studies, as it has already been
shown by De Long (1988) several years ago. A way to solve these issues is to conduct
the convergence analysis on a larger sample, by identifying the growth patterns without
prior restrictions.
In order to bring light into this debate, mixture models appear to be useful an-
alytical tools, since they allow us to endogenously identify unknown clusters in the
data, avoiding the imposition of ex ante selection criteria. The aim of this paper is to
analyze the long-term growth experiences using an unrestricted sample of 64 nations
since 1870, to see whether we can identify the existence of di¤erent convergence regimes
and whether the OECD-club really stands out during the two phases of globalization.
The model we test is in the framework of the beta-convergence hypothesis (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 2004), for which we use data on the initial level, and on the growth rate,
of GDP per capita.
We nd that the period 1870-2003 is characterized by the segmentation of cross-
country growth behavior. Over the long-run, the model identies two regimes; the rst
one basically consists of the OECD-club and is characterized by convergence of per
capita income, while the other one comprises the rest of the nations and is denoted
by divergence and low level of development. When the sample is split up into three
historical epochs of global and anti-global waves, we do not nd evidence of an early
converging OECD-club between 1870 and 1913. This outcome is in contrast with the
prior ndings in economic history, where it has been argued that the period saw rapid
convergence between those nations that were globalizing (Williamson 1996). We show
instead that the converging dynamism of the advanced economies only emerged after
World War II, which suggests that the assessment of economic convergence with an
exogenously selected sample of countries may bring misleading results about the growth
regimes in the long-run.
Our results are partly analogous to those obtained by Epstein et al. (2003), who nd
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that convergence was the key feature for the industrialized economies only during the
post-1950 era. Indeed, the positive causality between globalization and convergence
turns out to be historically ambiguous, if the intra-periods dynamics are distinctly
analyzed.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 focuses on the sources of long-term
convergence; Section 3 explains the econometric specication; Section 4 presents the
data; Section 5 describes the results; and Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Sources of long-run convergence
The long-term view to convergence has been central to the writings of economic histori-
ans such as Abramowitz (1986) and Baumol (1986). Their studies build on the data set
collected by Maddison (1982; 1995) that provides data about GDP per worker and per
capita for a large part of the worlds countries from 1870. Williamson (1996) focused
on convergence in real wages and other factor prices over the long-run. The general
picture that have emerged from these studies is that there have been three distinct
eras in global history: 1870-1913, 1913-1950 and post-1950, and that convergence was
a general feature during the two trade-booms in the late 19th century and after the
Second World War.1
According to Williamson two important features of the world economy since 1970
also characterized the economy in the late 19th century. First, the earlier period was
one of rapid globalization: capital and labor owed across national frontiers in unprece-
dented quantities, and commodity trade boomed as transport costs dropped sharply.
Second, the late 19th century underwent an impressive convergence in living standards,
at least within most of what we would now call the OECD club(1998, p. 51).
Many other studies have documented that the First Global Wave (1870-1913) was
a period of globalization in capital ows, migration and trade. Concerning the capital
markets, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) provided quantitative evidence of a U-shaped
evolution of international capital ows over the 20th century, in which the level of
foreign investments, relative to the size of the world economy, was about as large in
1900-1914 as it was in 1980 (around an estimated 20 per cent of world GDP). Taylor
(2002) also pointed out that global capital market integration seems to have returned
to its pre-1913 level only fairly recently, at least when measured by the relationship
between savings and investments, which was tighter in 1913-1974 than before and after.
Similarly, early globalization in world trade has been documented by Feenstra
(1998), who showed that the level of merchandise trade to GDP in 1913 was not reached
again until the late 1960s or 1970s. Estevadeordal et al. (2003) established a similar
trade pattern and argue that the rise of the gold standard and the fall in transport
costs were the main trade-creating forces until 1913. As for the labor markets, mass
1Although the post-war period is often divided into two distinct phases: 1950-1973 and the period
post-1973, with this latter being demarked by stagation, slower growth rates and the break-down of
the international economic framework established at Bretton-Woods.
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migration has been thoroughly documented for the First Global Wave, as about 55
million Europeans left home for the New World between 1850 and 1914 (Hatton and
Williamson 1998).
These strong globalization forces in the pre-1913 period have often been connected
to forces of convergence, especially among the countries of the so-called OECD-club.
Taylor and Williamson argue, for example, that the period saw dramatic convergence,
about as dramatic as it has been over the past century and a half, among the present
OECD countries, or an even wider sample of nations (1997, p. 27). This convergence,
they assert, was to a large extent accounted for by the massive migration ows between
Europe and the New World which helped erase productivity gaps in labor productivity
and wages. They estimate such large e¤ects of migration on convergence that it must
have been o¤set by countervailing forces. For instance, capital accumulation could
have been such a force, since capital chased after immigrants and natural resources
exploitation. This implies that capital dampened any downward pressure migration
otherwise would have had on real wages in the New World, and that capital inows
nanced accumulation, thereby augmenting the labor demand. Thus, even though the
conventional Heckscher-Ohlin prediction would be that capital and labor would ow in
opposite directions as a result of trade, the evidence from First Global Wave contrasts
with this mechanism (Hatton and Williamson 2008).
Although factor accumulation patterns did not follow the standard predictions in
this early period, the literature still points towards accumulation playing a larger role in
explaining the suggested labor productivity convergence than the one that characterized
the post-war period, where technological transfers and human capital have been more
broadly emphasized as sources of convergence. According to this view, Taylor (1999)
develops a model that takes into account the massive ows of capital and labor to the
resource-abundant New World to explain convergence in labor productivity between
seven OECD countries in the late 19th century, while it down-plays the importance of
technological transfers and human capital.
Because of the focus on factor accumulation and factor price equalization as sources
of convergence before 1913, a large part of the evidence has rested on data on real
wages and labor productivity, only indirectly o¤ering evidence for convergence in GDP
per capita. The factor price convergence approach has clear merits when it comes to
understanding the mechanisms of labor productivity convergence, since productivity
convergence by denition may be accounted for by either absolute convergence in real
wages, or relative factor endowments or factor prices (ORourke et al. 1996).
In fact, Taylor and Williamson (1997) analyze convergence in wages, GDP per
worker and per capita simultaneously, and call upon agnosticism in what variable that
provides the correctconvergence criterion, although they emphasize that the dynamics
of wage and output measures should remain distinct and that the choice of a partic-
ular variable should depend on the question under consideration (1997, p. 32). For
example, they nd that convergence in GDP per capita was slower and less inuenced
by migration compared to convergence in wages and labor productivity. This result
is due to o¤setting forces inherent in the algebra of their model, in which labor sup-
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ply losses suppressed output in the Old World while increasing labor productivity and
wages (1997, p. 43). In addition, ORourke and Williamson (1999) acknowledge that
the open-economy mechanisms behind convergence in the late 19th century only inu-
enced GDP per capita indirectly. Still, they maintain, that convergence did not only
appear in labor markets, but that was also extended, albeit at slower rates, to GDP
per capita.
In this paper we focus on the broader question whether convergence was a long-run
phenomenon in GDP per capita, although acknowledging that factor prices play a role
in the explanation of those dynamics. More specically, we focus on the recent debate
brought about by Epstein et al. (2003), who questioned whether the period 1870-1914
really was a phase of unconditional GDP per capita convergence fuelled by globalization,
even within the OECD-club. Using distribution dynamics methods (Quah 1993; 1996)
applied to Maddisons GDP per capita data, they nd that the long-run equilibrium of
the pre-1914 period was characterized by forces of stratication rather than convergence
and argue that this latter was primarily a feature after World War II.
To this picture of dispersion, ORourke and Williamson (1997) add that there were
large varieties in growth experiences within the Old World before 1914. For example,
although Ireland, Italy and the Scandinavian countries went through a spectacular
catch-up with the industrial core, Spain and Portugal lagged behind. The authors also
show that globalization was by far the dominant force accounting for these di¤ering
economic outcomes and suggest several hypotheses, covering the failure of capital ows
to seek out cheap labor, diversities in schooling, and factor market isolation.
Given the recent debate about convergence and globalization in historical perspec-
tive, this paper will explicitly test whether we can endogenously identify the convergence
patterns during the whole period 1870-2003, as well as during the two sub-periods 1870-
1913 and 1950-2003, and if an early converging OECD-club can be detected also for
the First Global Wave. In doing this, the statistical inference about the relationship
between globalization and convergence is drawn from the historical periods.
3 Identifying cross-country growth regimes
In order to endogenously analyze the cross-country growth behavior we make use of a
mixture of linear regression. The main feature of this model consists in the ability to
uncover heterogeneous growth regimes in the sample, without imposing a priori or ad
hoc assumptions on the adherence of each country to a specic regime.2 In general,
mixture models have been employed to test the existence of poverty traps or convergence
clubs (see Paap and Van Dijk 1998; and Bloom et al. 2003), after the pioneering work
by Quah (1996) which identied the so-called twin peaksin the income distribution
worldwide. This kind of models has been increasingly applied to t the distribution of
regional incomes, as in Tsionas (2000), Pittau (2005), and Pittau and Zelli (2006).
2A brief review of the empirical methods useful to identify the heterogeneity in growth patterns is
provided by Durlauf et al. 2005, pp. 616-624.
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As far as we know, mixture models in the form of mixtures of growth regression
have been previously used by Paap et al. (2005), Alfò et al. (2008) and Battisti and
Di Vaio (2008). Paap et al. (2005), for instance, apply a latent class analysis to a
panel type growth regression, so to classify a set of developing country according to
their average growth rates over the period 1961-2000. Alfò et al. (2008) develop a
multivariate mixture approach to assess the predictive capability of saving and human
capital formation rates, in explaining the worldwide heterogeneity of both levels and
growth rates of per capita income from 1960 to 1995. Battisti and Di Vaio (2008)
implement a mixture of cross-sectional growth regression with the aim of uncovering
multiple regimes of per capita income convergence across EU regions, over the period
1980-2002.
The perspective adopted here follows up the work by Battisti and Di Vaio (2008),
since the model adopted does not explicitly test the so-called club convergencehy-
pothesis. This latter phenomenon would imply that, for each country, the probability
of falling in a regime should depend on some specic variables related to the initial
conditions of the country. In contrast, we consider the probability to belong to a club
as a parameter to be estimated in the model.3 Thus our model can be seen as a more
general test of multiple regimes and aims to provide a correct assessment of which
countries fall in each specic regime.
Lets start assuming that for each country i, the average growth rate of per capita
income, gi = [log(yi;T )  (yi;t)] =T , between time t and T , is given by
gi = j + j log(yi;0) + "i;j, with probability j, (1)
where yi;0 denotes the income per capita level at the beginning of the period, j is a
constant representing the steady-state determinants of the economy, j is a convergence
parameter approximating the speed at which the economy reaches the steady-state,
"i;j  N(0; 2j) is a random shock a¤ecting the growth rate of the economy, and j =
1; :::; k is the regime which the country belongs to. Expression (1) is usually named
beta-convergenceequation, after the famous study by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
If j is estimated with a negative (positive) sign, the evidence supports that poor
countries tend to grow faster (slower) than rich ones and eventually converge to (diverge
from) this latter.4
Let gi be distributed as a nite mixture of conditional univariate normal densities:
gi 
kX
j=1
jfi;j(gi j log(yi;0); j; 2j), (2)
3Such parameter does not depend on the initial level of income, nor it is subject to any threshold in
the factor accumulation, as in multiple equilibria models by Azariadis and Drazen (1990), and Galor
(1996).
4As is well known, the estimated convergence parameter is usually biased if the steady-state deter-
minants vary across the economies and are related to the explanatory variables. In this framework, we
mitigate this problem allowing for di¤erent intercepts across regimes.
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where
fi;j(gi j log(yi;0); j; 2j) =
1q
22j
exp
"
   gi   j   j log(yi;0)2
22j
#
. (3)
The mixing proportions j, i.e. the probabilities to belong to a regime, are unknown
and should be jointly estimated with the other parameters of the model. Higher the
probability, more precise the identication of the regime is. This aspect makes clear that
an ad hoc assignment of the countries to the regimes may be conducive of misleading
results, due to an arbitrary imposition of the probabilities. Particularly, we might
erroneously asses that, for instance, a country obeys to a converging pattern, while, on
the contrary, it follows a diverging one.
If the set of observations gi is independently and identically distributed, the joint
density or likelihood of the model, L, can be written as
L =
nY
i=1
24 kX
j=1
j
1q
22j
exp
"
   gi   j   j log(yi;0)2
22j
#35 , (4)
or, in its logarithmic form,
logL =
nX
i=1
log
24 kX
j=1
j
1q
22j
exp
"
   gi   j   j log(yi;0)2
22j
#35 . (5)
Estimation of the parameters of interest, j, j, 
2
j , and j, can be conducted
maximizing equation (5), subject to the constraint
Pk
j=1 j = 1. The condition 
2
j > 0
is required to avoid the unboundedness of the likelihood function. Once estimates are
obtained, i.e. bj, bj, b2j , and bj, each country i is assigned to regime j looking at the
posterior probabilities b i;j, calculated by means of Bayes rule as
b i;j = bjfi;j(gi j log(yi;0); bj; bj; b2j)Pk
j=1
bjfi;j(gi j log(yi;0); bj; bj; b2j) . (6)
Basically,
country i 2 regime j if b i;j > b i;m 8m 6= j = 1; :::; k. (7)
The stationary equations of the maximum log-likelihood expressed in (5) are derived
by DeSarbo and Cron (1988). As for the estimation, it can be straightforwardly dealt
with the application of the Expectations-Maximization (EM) algorithm (see Dempster
et al. 1977). The EM algorithm works as follows: in the E-step, estimates of j and
 i;j are obtained maximizing the expected log-likelihood, while in the M-step j, j,
2j are estimated performing k weighted least squares regressions, which weights are
given by the posterior probabilities. This latter step has been proved to be equivalent
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to maximum likelihood estimation (see DeSarbo and Cron 1988, for technical details).
After the starting values of the parameters are assigned,5 the algorithm iterates until a
specied convergence criterion is achieved.6 While the procedure provides a monotone
increase of the objective function, convergence to a global optimum is not ensured, due
to non-convexity of the log-likelihood function. To check the robustness of the results,
several trials can be carried out.7
Making inference, as well as to calculate condence intervals, requires the variance-
covariance matrix of the parameters, which are asymptotically normal, being estimated
by maximum likelihood. Louis (1982) shows how to derive the Fisher information ma-
trix in EM environments. The inverse of this matrix provides the estimated covariance
matrix (see Turner 2000, for computational aspects).
An open issue relates to the choice of the k components, i.e. regimes, of the mixture.
In principle, there is no need of mixture whenever a one-component model ts the data
well. On the contrary, if a mixture model is specied, it has to be shown that the
selection of two components, instead of three, for instance, is a better choice. To this
end, a decision criterion needs be adopted, even though no universal rule exists in the
literature. We base our decision choice upon two main rules. First, following Turner
(2000) we calculate a sequential likelihood ratio (LR) test of k versus k+1 components.
The test is based on parametric bootstrap, since the likelihood ratio statistic is not
regularly distributed.8 Second, according to Hawkins et al. (2001), we look at the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
BIC =  2 logL+ np log n, (8)
where np is the number of free parameters, equalling the dimension of the parameters
vector minus one. The rationale of this criterion relies on assigning a penalty function to
the less parsimonious model, because the log-likelihood can be an increasing function of
the components number. The BIC is the recommended criterion for choosing between
one and two components, in the case of a mixture of linear regression (see Hawkins et
al., 2001). Finally, the model is selected according to the results of the two rules.
4 Description of the data
To estimate the model described in Section 2, we only need data on per capita GDP.
These are taken for 64 countries, over the period 1870-2003, from the database His-
torical Statistics for the World Economy: 1-2003 AD, developed by Angus Maddison,
which is downloadable from the Internet page http://www.ggdc.net/maddison (last up-
5In absence of specic priors, as in the present case, they are generated randomly.
6We set a threshold equal to 0.000001.
7We run 100 trials, choosing the estimates from the model with the highest log-likelihood value.
The results, however, are very stable.
8The test is conducted launching 1000 replications.
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date: August 2007).9 GDP per capita is expressed in 1990 International Geary-Khamis
dollars (for detailed notes, see Maddison 1995; 2001; 2003).
Some doubts have been cast about the reliability of such data, since they are ex-
trapolated from present-day PPP adjusted GDP levels, on the basis of volume indices
of real product. This approach implies that the basket of goods and services used to
construct the end-year PPP converter is supposed to be stable over time, something
which cannot be very realistic in the long-run (Prados de la Escosura 2000). Unfortu-
nately, alternative estimates usually include too few observations, not allowing to make
inference on a larger set of countries and since much of our previous knowledge about
convergence in the long-run relies on evidence from Maddisons data, we prefer to use
the same sources for the present analysis.
5 Discussion of the results
As for the full period 1870-2003, the model clearly identies two distinct regimes, ac-
cording to both the selection criteria adopted. The sequential LR test shown in Table
1 strongly rejects the null hypothesis of one versus two components of the mixture
(the P-value is 1 per cent), while it is not able to reject the null of two versus three
components at any conventional signicance level.10
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
The values of the BIC reported in Table 2 also suggest the selection of two com-
ponents. This means that a single (one-component) growth regression is not the best
model to t the data and produces misleading results, due to the assignment of the
same growth pattern to all the countries in the sample.
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
The results from the estimated mixture model are shown in Table 3. Over the
period 1870-2003, one regime has been signicantly converging (with a beta coe¢ cient
of -0.007) and the other one signicantly diverging (beta is 0.003), indicating that
convergence of income per capita towards a common level is not a general feature
between the countries of the world in the long-run. The majority of the countries
fall in the diverging regime, but the model identies a convergence club consisting of
19 countries. Those countries can be recognized from Table 4 in which the posterior
probabilities of the countries belonging to each regime are shown. Regime 1 here refers
to the convergence club whereas regime 2 stands for divergence. As seen from Table 4,
many of the OECD countries show large probabilities of being assigned to regime 1.
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
9For the list of countries see Table 4.
10The empirical distribution of the test is shown in Figure 1.
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A few exceptions emerge: Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain fall in the diverging
regime due to relatively low average growth rates for the full period. Iberias failure
to converge to the OECD-club is well-documented in economic history and has been
explained by a relative failure to industrialize during the late 19th century. Tortella
(1994) argues that the Iberian retardation can be assigned to agricultural backwardness
and low levels of investment in human capital, as evidenced by low enrolment and
literacy rates. It is also the case that the revision of the Maddisons GDP per worker-
hour data for Italy and the Iberian countries has cast some doubt on the unconditional
convergence hypothesis that was supported by the early studies (see ORourke and
Williamson 1997, p. 161 for a discussion). Germany is particularly penalized by the
slow growth of the inter-war years and thus therefore assigned to the diverging regime.
The relative decline of German industrial productivity during the inter-war years has
been documented by early scholars, although more recent work has emphasized that
Germanys modest economic performance was rather due to large peasant agriculture
and backwardness in the service sector (Broadberry 1997).
What is more, USA and New Zealand fall in the diverging regime, since they are
both countries with high GDP in 1870 that are growing richer over time. Accordingly,
these countries acted as diverging forces in the world economy.
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Although we nd evidence of a long-run OECD club we do not nd any converging
regime during the First Global Wave 1870-1913, as can be seen from Table 3. In this
case, however, the selection criteria provide a discordant information, since the LR
test does not reject the null of one versus two components, while the BIC chooses the
two-component model.11 We prefer the parsimonious specication, given by the one-
component model. Anyway, if we were willing to accept the model with two components,
results would not di¤er in qualitative terms, since two diverging regimes were estimated
instead of one (see Table 3).12 This clearly contradicts the Williamson (1996) notion of
convergence between trading nations during the First Global Wave.
The scatter plots in Figure 2 show the estimated t of the model during the di¤erent
epochs. The full period is displayed in the upper left panel, where the converging regime
stands out as a range of countries positioned along a straight line with a clear negative
slope and a small condence band. The diverging regime shows up in the slightly
positive slope of the tted line, but the condence band is much larger. As opposed
to the scatter plot from the full period, the plot in the upper right panel does not
indicate any convergence club during the rst epoch of globalization. The slope of the
tted line, produced by the one-component specication, rather shows divergence and
no distinct growth pattern is found among the countries that had the highest logged
GDP per capita in 1870.
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
11Shifting from one to two components, however, produces only a small decrease in the value of the
BIC (see Table 2).
12The convergence parameters of regime 1 and 2 are almost identical (0.002 and 0.004, respectively).
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From convergence theory we would expect the richest countries to face modest
growth rates due to decreasing marginal returns to capital. Instead, looking at the
period 1870-1913, these countries are positioned in two clusters on each side of the t-
ted line. Countries like Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Uruguay
follow the predicted pattern since they are all below the tted line and thus exhibit some
tendency for slower growth than many countries in the sample. However, there is a set
of initially rich countries that are showing relatively high growth rates and diverging
tendencies during the period. These countries cluster above the tted line and are Aus-
tria, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France and Switzerland. Many of these nations have
earlier been assigned to a converging regime in wages and labor productivity. Taylor
(1999), for example, specically states that the labor productivity growth patterns of
Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, UK, USA and Australia were providing evidence
that 1870-1914 was an era of convergence, with a speed of about 1 per cent per annum
(Taylor 1999, p. 1623).
The late 19th century growth of the Scandinavian countries has often been described
as a catch-up phenomenon and taken as evidence for the strong forces of convergence
during the First Global Wave. ORourke andWilliamson document a spectacular catch-
up in factor prices, but smaller e¤ects in GDP per worker-hour and even less so in GDP
per capita (1997, pp. 158-59). A lions part of the estimated factor price convergence is
assigned to mass migration from Scandinavia to the New World. However, the scatter
plot in Figure 2 does not suggest that the growth pattern of the Scandinavian countries
contributed to a general picture of convergence among the 64 countries during the First
Global Wave. On the contrary, Sweden, Norway and Denmark cluster on a position
right in line with the condence interval of the tted lines positive slope. This is
because these three countries were initially quite rich compared with the rest of the
sample, and showed relatively high GDP per capita growth rates of 1.4-1.6 per cent
annually. Thus, although the Scandinavian countries have been singled out as backward
and fast-growing in accordance with the convergence hypothesis in the OECD context,
these countries cannot be considered poor in 1870 when compared with the rest of our
sample.
So what about capital movements? According to theory, capital should ow from
the rich industrial core to the poor periphery and contribute to convergence. This
pattern is for example conrmed in the Scandinavian case. The Scandinavian countries
were net importers of capital during these years, and the combination of capital inow
and outward migration has been suggested as a main source of growth. However,
it is also interesting to note that the exporters of capital, such as the initially rich
countries Germany and France, also showed high growth rates during the same period
and that we cannot nd any clear pattern of fast-growing capital importers and slow-
growing capital exporters. In addition, enormous amounts of capital were placed in
the New World, although countries like USA, New Zealand and Australia belonged to
the richest countries of the sample in 1870. The tendency for capital accumulation to
have a diverging e¤ect on the income distribution during this period has earlier been
documented by Taylor and Williamson (1997), among others. Still, one country that
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did adhere to the expected convergence pattern was Britain, which was one of the
wealthiest country in 1870, who did export large amounts of capital to the New World
and also did experience modest growth rates of only 1 per cent annually until 1913.
Even though the open market forces of migration and capital did create growth in
several parts of the world during the First Global Wave, the data do not unambiguously
support the claim of an early converging OECD-club. This becomes especially clear
in the larger country sample that we provide. It also appears that capital was owing
to countries that were already wealthy in 1870 and therefore acted as a countervailing
force to convergence.
Turning to the inter-war period 1913-1950, we identify only one regime. Also in this
case, the selection criteria do not provide a clear indication. The LR test selects the
two-component specication, while the BIC chooses the model with one component.
Anyway, the rejection of the null of one versus two components, produced by the LR
test, is not particularly strong, since the P-value is at the signicance threshold of 5 per
cent (see Table 1). Results do not substantially di¤er between the two specications,
since both of them support divergenceor at least persistenceof per capita income, as
it can be seen from Table 3. This nding underlines the pre-existing historical notion
that the inter-war period was characterized by a closing of markets that suppressed
the alleged convergence forces from the First Global Wave. The scatter plot in the
lower left panel in Figure 2 also shows that the period was characterized by diverging
tendencies and modest growth rates. The only exception is Venezuela, an initially poor
country showing growth rates of remarkably 5 per cent annually due to the discovery
of oil in the region.
The post-war period stands out as a period in which a group of 20 countries, mainly
members of the OECD, show strong and signicant convergence, while the rest of
the countries in the sample exhibit no clear patterns, e.g. persistence of per capita
income.13 Looking at the selection criteria, the choice of the two-component mixture is
clearly supported by the LR test, while the BIC seems to suggest a three-component
specication. The identication of the convergence regime, however, is robust to the
choice of the components number, since the estimation of a three-component mixture
produces the division of the large persistent regime in two smaller ones.14
Table 3 displays that the point estimate of the beta-coe¢ cient of regime 1 (-0.016)
is roughly twice as large as the estimate from the full period. From the posterior
probabilities in Table 4 we note that all but three of the converging countries in regime
1 (Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) belong to the OECD. On the other hand, 44
countries in our sample are assigned to regime 2, which exhibits no signicant pattern.
This suggests that, excluding the Asian tigers, large parts of the poor world has not
experienced the predicted convergence to the OECD. We do also nd a few OECD
countries, like Norway, United States (rich countries that were getting richer), Greece
and Portugal (countries with disappointing growth rates given their initial GDP), in
13The existence of multiple cross-country growth regimes over the post-1950 period has been inves-
tigated in the literature since the pioneering study by Durlauf and Johnson (1995).
14We do not show the results to save space.
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regime 2.
Finally, Table 4 indicates that the countries belonging to the long-run convergence
club are as good as identical to those singled out for the post-war period.15 The long-run
convergence pattern, that we estimated by means of the mixture of growth regression,
thus appears to be completely determined by the dynamics of the post-war period.
6 Concluding remarks
Although forces of globalization have been well-documented for the period 1870-1913,
this article shows that growth patterns have been diverse since 1870 and that it was
not until after World War II that globalization seems to have been accompanied by
convergence for a subset of nations belonging mainly to the OECD. The results highlight
that the use of a restricted sample of nations that have converged ex post may lead
to misleading results about the cross-country growth patterns in the long-run. In fact,
this latter was segmented in two worldwide regimes, the rst one being characterized
by higher growth rates as well as convergence of per capita income, and the other one
denoted by divergence and lower development rates.
The identication of the two growth regimes is plausibly consistent with the predic-
tions of some recent economic theories (Galor and Mountford 2006; 2008), which stress
the role of trade for the evolution of the long-term development patterns. In fact, the
increase in world trade due to globalization might have a¤ected the growth rate of per
capita income asymmetrically according to the comparative advantages of the nations.
On the one side, the resource-abundant countries tended to specialize in the production
of primary goods, reducing the incentive to invest in human capital and delaying the
demographic transition. On the other one, the resource-scarce countries specialized
in manufacturing, raising the investment in human capital, spurring the demographic
transition and shifting into a sustained stage of growth.
Looking at the converging club, when three historical epochs of global (1870-1913,
1950-2003) and anti-global (1913-1950) waves are analyzed separately, results show that
the dynamics which come to dominate over the whole period emerged only during the
second globalization stage. This nding is in line with Epstein et al. (2003) who reached
similar conclusions for a sample of industrialized countries, although using a completely
di¤erent methodology.
According to our results, the two trade-booms were not as similar in terms of conver-
gence as what has been previously argued. The First Global Wave exhibited a complex
inter-play between migration, capital and trade that made it less similar to the postwar
period, in terms of convergence. During this period capital did not seek out its highest
marginal returns, since much of it went to the resource rich New World and, although
15Norway was assigned to the converging regime for the full period, but its remarkable growth after
the discovery of oil in the 1970s puts it in the diverging regime when the post-war period is analyzed
separately. Spain, on the contrary, was assigned to the diverging regime for the full period, but due
to the rapid catch-up during the last decades it is assigned to the converging regime after 1950.
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migration acted as a converging force, the net result appears to have been divergence
in per capita GDP, even among the industrialized nations. Therefore, history only
ambiguously supports the positive relationship between globalization and convergence.
Future research should investigate why globalization has brought about convergence
in some countries but not in others and why these forces appear to be limited to the
last decades only. Especially the trade ows and their composition need to be further
analyzed.
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Table 1. Sequential LR test of k versus k + 1 components*
Period 1 vs 2 2 vs 3
18702003 26.6 (.01) 3.97 (.81)
18701913 3.85 (.76) -
19131950 17.2 (.05) 5.99 (.71)
19502003 26.3 (.00) 23.3 (.17)
* P-values between parentheses. Maximum number of components:
k = 3.
Table 2. Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. Selected
Period 1870-2003 -491.4 -497.2 -484.5 2 Comp.
Period 1870-1913 -510.2 -512.5 -510.9 2 Comp.
Period 1913-1950 -407.2 -403.6 -400.0 1 Comp.
Period 1950-2003 -378.8 -385.1 -391.8 3 Comp.
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Table 3. Cross-country growth regimes: estimation results
1 Component (OLS) 2 Components (ML)
Regime 1 Regime 2
Period 1870-2003
Constant .005 .070*** -.003
Log of p.c. GDP 1870 .002 -.007*** .003**
Weight (%) - 23 77
R-squared .03 - -
Log-likelihood 249.9 263.1 -
Period 1870-1913
Constant -.010 -.004*** -.013
Log of p.c. GDP 1870 .003*** .002*** .004***
Weight (%) - 18 82
R-squared .15 - -
Log-likelihood 259.2 270.8 -
Period 1913-1950
Constant -.015 -.038*** -.008
Log of p.c. GDP 1870 .003* .006*** .002
Weight (%) - 19 81
R-squared .05 - -
Log-likelihood 207.7 216.4 -
Period 1950-2003
Constant .045*** .168*** .044***
Log of p.c. GDP 1870 -.003 -.016*** -.003
Weight (%) - 25 75
R-squared .03 - -
Log-likelihood 193.6 207.1 -
***, **, * denote statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
In grey: mixture results. Dependent variable: average growth rate of per
capita GDP (various periods). Observations: 64.
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Table 4. Posterior probabilities*
Period 1870-2003 Period 1950-2003
Regime1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2
Austria 0.60 0.40 0.84 0.16
Belgium 0.56 0.44 0.70 0.30
Denmark 0.56 0.44 0.69 0.31
Finland 0.86 0.14 0.77 0.23
France 0.60 0.40 0.74 0.26
Germany 0.46 0.54 0.68 0.32
Italy 0.58 0.42 0.75 0.25
Netherlands 0.57 0.43 0.68 0.32
Norway 0.56 0.44 0.49 0.51
Sweden 0.66 0.34 0.64 0.36
Switzerland 0.57 0.43 0.60 0.40
United Kingdom 0.61 0.39 0.61 0.39
Ireland 0.51 0.49 0.69 0.31
Greece 0.03 0.97 0.01 0.99
Portugal 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.99
Spain 0.42 0.58 0.77 0.23
Australia 0.62 0.38 0.68 0.32
New Zealand 0.21 0.79 0.02 0.98
Canada 0.62 0.38 0.68 0.32
United States 0.10 0.90 0.20 0.80
Albania 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Bulgaria 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Czechoslovakia 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Hungary 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Poland 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Romania 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Russia (USSR) 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Yugoslavia 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Argentina 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Brazil 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Chile 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Mexico 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Uruguay 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Venezuela 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Jamaica 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
China 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
India 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Indonesia 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
* In grey: regime 1.
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Table 4. Continued*
Japan 0.99 0.01 0.96 0.04
Philippines 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
South Korea 0.95 0.05 0.99 0.01
Thailand 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Taiwan 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Burma 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Hong Kong 0.99 0.01 0.83 0.17
Malaysia 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Nepal 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Singapore 0.99 0.01 0.95 0.05
Sri Lanka 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
North Korea 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Vietnam 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Iran 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Iraq 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Jordan 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Lebanon 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Syria 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Turkey 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
West Bank and Gaza 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Algeria 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Egypt 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Ghana 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Morocco 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
South Africa 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Tunisia 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
* In grey: regime 1.
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Figure 1. Empirical distribution of the LR test*
Period 1870-2003 Period 1870-1913
Period 1913-1950 Period 1950-2003
*1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 2. Cross-country growth regimes: models t*
Period 1870-2003 Period 1870-1913
Period 1913-1950 Period 1950-2003
*Solid line: regression t; dotted line: condence band at 95% level.
23
